The ESA defines "endangered species" as "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range."
18 A "threatened species," by contrast, is defined as "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 19 A "species" need not be an actual species, however. Rather, the ESA defines "species" is defined to include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 
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Adler -Species Science Charade Page 7 endangered. 466 species are listed as threatened. 23 Although the FWS is authorized to list species on its own initiative, most species listings are the result of petitions filed by researchers or environmentalist groups, and many are the result of litigation.
24
Under Section 4, listing determinations are to be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available" 25 This formulation is not unique to the ESA, 26 and is based upon language from earlier federal species conservation statutes. 27 Because the standard focuses on what information and analysis is "available" it does not require that the data relied upon by the agency surpass any particularly quantitative or qualitative threshold. 28 The Act does, 23 Id. 24 See Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 496-97. Insofar as litigation s used to drive listing decisions, it threatens to divert resources away from conservation efforts the FWS would have otherwise prioritized. As Professor Wyman explains, "the FWS has lost control over the listing process as decisions about whether to list species are largely made in response to citizen petitions for listing and litigation." Id. at 496. This is a significant problem for species conservation efforts. 25 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(1).
The Secretary shall make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a review of the status of the species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction; or on the high seas.
however, identify a series of factors to consider in assessing risks to species. 29 Once a species is listed, critical habitat designations must also be based upon the "best scientific data available," though the Secretary is also required to consider potential economic and other impacts of such designations.
30
The ESA's "best available" science requirement "rests on the assumption that conservation policy decisions can be made objectively on the basis of existing or reasonably attainable scientific knowledge." 31 While listing decisions must be made on the "best available science," the Act does not specify the extent to which predicate determinations, such as what constitutes a species, must also be made exclusively on a scientific basis. 32 The terms "endangered" and "threatened," although defined in the act, also lack and scientifically defined parameters.
33
29 Under 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1), in analyzing whether a species is endangered or threatened, the Secretary must determine whether the risk to the species is "because of any of the following factors:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence." 30 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(2) (providing that critical habitat designations are to be made "on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat."). 31 See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1056. 32 See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1095. 33 See infra
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As of May 2017, the FWS had delisted 78 species, subspecies, and species populations under the ESA. 34 Of these, ten were delisted due to extinction, and nineteen were delisted due to a taxonomic or data error. 35 Of the remaining 47 -those the FWS identifies as "recovered" --some of these represent not distinct species, but distinct populations of a given species. For instance, the FWS delisting report separately lists nine populations of humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae), accounting for nearly one-fifth of species "recovered" by the Act.
36
The fact that species are occasionally delisted because of data errors or a need to revise taxonomic determinations highlights the fact that species are necessarily listed based upon incomplete knowledge. 37 When the Tennessee snail darter was discovered in Tennessee's Tellico
River, researchers understandably assumed that the small fresh-water fish was quite rare. After all, it had not been discovered before. 
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The relatively small number of delisted species -and the even smaller number of those species the FWS deems "recovered" -is the basis for substantial criticism of the Act. 40 The ESA's stated goal of recovering species from the brink of extinction "has been reached in distressingly few cases." 41 To some (including this author), the ESA can hardly be deemed a success if only two percent of listed species have been recovered in the past forty-some years.
42
Others argue that the focus on recoveries is misplaced, however, as the real measure of the ESA's success is the even smaller number of extinctions. 43 In this view, the ESA may not be nursing endangered populations back to health, but it is preventing them from going extinct.
44
A 2007 study found that listing a species does not appear to lead to an improvement in that species' status. 45 To the contrary, this study found that listing a species can actually be detrimental if the listing is not followed with significant funding on species recovery. 46 As the
DRAFT-Not for Citation
Adler -Species Science Charade Page 11 authors explained: "Our analysis suggests that it is not the act of listing itself that matters, but rather high levels of expenditures for recovery combined with listing. Simply listing a species in the absence of such expenditures appears to lead to a decline." 47 Other studies seem to support the conclusion that spending on species conservation is more important than listing. 48 One problem with all such analyses, however, is that they tend to be based upon FWS assessments of species status, and such assessments are anything but scientific. As one set of researchers concluded, FWS assessments are somewhat subjective, lack transparent criteria, and "may be manipulated to achieve agency objectives. 

Adler -Species Science Charade Page 14 scientific matters. 62 In the process, accountability and transparency for normative policy judgments is obscured. By appealing to scientific authority policymakers are able to escape responsibility for their policy decisions. 63 By presenting policy choices as "scientific,"
potentially controversial policy choices are perceived as more legitimate by the lay public.
64
The imposition of regulatory constraints on economically productive activity necessarily creates winners and losers. Environmental advocates may cheer regulations that restrict the use of toxic chemicals or prevent the development of species habitat, while regulated industries may decry such measures and the costs they impose. 65 Choosing a side necessarily risks alienating one side of the issue. Embracing the "science charade" offers a way out of this dilemma for policymakers, as they may insist that a given policy measure is dictated by science, instead of their own policy preferences. (2004) ("Science has considerable rhetorical appeal when it comes to defending regulatory decisions, as it is often described and perceived as being 'objective."').
65 In reality, conflicts over regulation are usually more complicated than environmentalists on one side and industry on the other. In many instances, some industry groups benefit from the imposition of regulations because such measures may suppress competition or create a comparative advantage. 66 Wagner, supra note __, at 1651 ("no rational agency or administrative official acting in her own self-interest would expose the underlying policy choices when faced with the numerous benefits of engaging in the science charade and the high price for proceeding any other way.").
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The complex nature of many environmental policy decisions may make it more difficult for a rationally ignorant lay public to understand the role that science does-or does not-play in particular decisions. 67 This problem is compounded by the tendency of scientists themselves to obscure the limits of scientific determinations. 68 As Wagner noted, "scientists have been shown to deliberately misidentify the hazy line between science and policy." 69 This occurs both when scientists and policy experts fail to identify or disclose the limits of existing scientific research, as well as when scientific researchers fail to disclose the choices they have made to address underlying uncertainties or the limits of existing research.
70
In some cases, the charade may be deliberate, as when a scientific expert is playing the role of policy advocate, seeking to advance her own policy preferences. 71 In other cases, it may be the charade results from the incentives created the underlying legal and policy framework.
Insofar as some statutes mandate that specific regulatory or other actions follow from predicate scientific determinations -such as a requirement that the FWS must take specified actions once a species is classified as "endangered" --the "science charade" may be inevitable 67 On rational ignorance in the electorate, see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013). 68 See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 111 ("When regulators and scientists debate policy issues in scientific language that is not easily accessible, they make it harder for the lay public to participate meaningfully in debates and hold decision-makers accountable for choices that ultimate turn on values, not complex science."). 69 See Wagner, supra note __, at 1628. See also Edward J. Rykiel, Scientific Objectivity, Value Systems, and Policymaking, 51 BIOSCIENCE 433, 434 (2001) ("Scientists typically portray the information they provide to the public as objective and value free, with the implication that those traits confer greater weight to their opinions than should be accorded to the value laden opinions of nonscientists."). 70 See Wagner, supra note __, at 1629 ("Agency scientists and bureaucrats engage in a 'science charade' by failing first to identify the major interstices left by science . . and second to reveal the policy choices they made to fill each trans-scientific gap."). 71 On scientists as policy advocates, see generally PIELKE, supra note __. 
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Adler -Species Science Charade Page 19 disagreements over species conservation policy and, in this particular case, whether existing and potential threats to the existence of the Preble's meadow jumping mouse in particular parts of the country justified the imposition of potentially costly regulatory measures.
The fight over the Preble's meadow jumping mouse encapsulates how the rhetoric of science is used as a weapon in fights over species conservation policy. It illustrates how the "science charade" Professor Wagner described in the context of toxic risk regulation also occurs in species conservation under the ESA. Indeed, in some respects the charade is written into the law itself.
87
The conclusion that a species is "endangered" in all or a part of its range triggers regulatory constraints on economic activity. This means the most effective means to influence ESA regulation is to influence the decision whether or not to list a species as endangered.
Although it is possible to obtain case-by-case regulatory exemptions, as with incidental take permits, even this process may be costly. For most of those affected by the ESA's regulatory burdens, there is relatively little ability to influence agency action once listing decisions have been made. Similarly, if an environmentalist group wishes to use the ESA to chill development, the purportedly scientific listing decision is the best place for it to focus its efforts.
In this way the ESA funnels efforts to influence regulatory decision-making toward the listing process and creates massive incentives to influence how listing decisions are made.
Efforts to advance normative or interest-driven policy preferences must be advanced through scientific debates over whether species merit listing. At the same time, the ESA's "best available science" mandate itself masks policy-driven judgments about how species should be classified 87 See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 100 ("the Act promotes a 'science charade.'").
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and threats to species survival should be identified. The combination is a pervasive science charade throughout the ESA drama.
A. Science under Pressure
In theory, the addition of an imperiled species to the list of endangered and threatened species should be a relatively routine matter driven by scientific considerations. The reality is quite different. A proposal to list a species often signals the onset of fierce political and administrative battles in which true scientific concerns are subordinated to policy objectives, as occurred with the Preble's meadow jumping mouse. 88 One reason for this is that the scientific determination that a given species is threatened or endangered triggers non-discretionary regulatory requirements. Under the ESA, the surest way to control a policy outcome is to control the science. Activists on all sides recognize this fact, which is why activists spend so much time trying to influence the scientific conclusions.
89
Property owners who own potential habitat for a given species are likely to oppose listing of the species so as to prevent regulation of their land. 29, 52 (1999) . 95 See Ando, Waiting, supra note __, at 34 ("Long delay in the addition of a species to the endangered species list can reduce the likelihood that the species will escape extinction; species have even been thought to have become extinct while waiting for final action from the agency. Thus, delay diminishes the benefits of a listing. It also reduces the costs."). 
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Because listing a species can have such significant regulatory effects, groups opposing environmentally harmful development, such as environmentalist groups, have an incentive to identify potentially endangered species in areas where such development threatens to occur.
Andy Stahl of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund acknowledged that "the ultimate goal" of environmentalist litigation to list the northern spotted owl was "to delay the harvest of old growth forests so as to give Congress a chance to provide specific statutory protection for those forests." 97 According to Stahl, the owl was a "surrogate" that could ensure "protection for the forests" under the ESA. 98 The spotted owl litigation was not without its environmental costs, however. In order to respond to environmentalist lawsuits, the FWS was forced to divert resources from more pressing needs, compromising overall recovery efforts. 99 This does not appear to be an isolated instance, as the pattern of environmentalist litigation challenging FWS listing decisions does not appear to align with species conservation priorities.
The use of scientific findings as a trigger for regulation may also compromise the ability to obtain better scientific information about the threats posed to endangered species, particularly on private land. The threat of land-use regulation discourages private landowners from disclosing information and cooperating with scientific research on their land, further essential role to play in this inquiry, but the ultimate judgment does not represent a purely scientific conclusion.
In the context of delineating species, the lack of a single, universally accepted set of taxonomic criteria leaves researchers to make value judgments -judgments about whether it is better to err on the side of differentiating two organisms or not. 121 "The choice is one of convenience, usefulness for a specific purpose, or aesthetic judgment, not the objective, universal sort of determination of the public expects from 'science,'" notes professor Doremus.
122
What degree of genetic difference or reproductive isolation is required for two organism populations to be considered two separate species or subspecies? Such choices are also not made behind a veil of ignorance as to their likely effects. Given the existence of the ESA, the decision to err on the side of differentiating species, subspecies and distinct populations will, on the whole, lead to a greater number of species listings, triggering ever more regulation. The valuebased choice as to whether to err on the side of greater differentiation is not made in a vacuum, but in full view of the practical policy consequences such a choice will have.
123
The science charade is arguably even greater when it comes to determining what constitutes an "endangered" or "threatened" species. Here the Act expressly prohibits the FWS from relying upon anything other than the "best scientific and commercial data available. 76 (1982) . Yaffee quotes a biologist pointing out that the more organisms are differentiated, "the more protection you end up with." Id.
the terms "endangered" and "threatened," though defined in the Act, are not scientifically determinate either.
125
In order to determine that a given species is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range," one has to determine what constitutes a meaningful "danger," as well as what constitutes a "significant portion" of the species' range. These determinations necessarily involve assessing risks and making value judgments about how to evaluate threats.
After all, all species face some threat of extinction, however remote. 126 In this respect, the judgment is not particularly different than ones that must be made by other environmental agencies. 127 Here again, science has an essential role to play in helping to identify and quantify potential risks to species. Yet science alone is not capable of determining whether a species is endangered. 128 Ultimately, FWS must make a policy judgment as to how precautionary it chooses to be in defining and applying the relative terms. In pretending to make such science, when they are really about something else. 131 What is controversial about the ESA is not that species are listed on "bad science," but that environmental activists and progressive administrations tend to prefer a more precautionary and pro-regulatory approach to species conservation than do many industries and anti-regulatory administrations. Some would prefer to err on the side of assuming a species is in greater danger of extinction than it may be, and adopting protective regulatory measures as a precaution. Others take the opposite view. Yet as scientific determinations, such as the decision to list a particular species, is what drives the ESA's regulatory measures, science is where reform efforts often focus, and the underlying differences on normative policy questions (such as how precautionary species conservation regulations should be) are submerged.
Were a member of Congress to argue that precautionary regulation to help conserve endangered species was unwarranted, or that relieving local economies of regulatory burdens is is preferable to increase the risk that some species disappear from certain parts of the country if not go extinct altogether, this position would necessarily risk alienating important political constituencies. By instead calling for "sound science," those urging reform can engage in the charade of advancing a more neutral value -scientific policymaking. In some cases, constraining or burdening the use of available scientific data could do more than constrain regulation. The "best available" requirement means that government 137 See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1075 ("By calling for reliance on the 'best available' scientific information, Congress explicitly recognized that in some circumstances the scientific evidence supporting listing determinations might be weak.").
138 Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035-36 ("Because so little is known about so many disappearing species, the best available scientific evidence is often highly uncertain."). 139 The precautionary posture of the ESA can also be seen in Section 7, which requires agencies to ensure that their actions will not jeopardize a listed species. 
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Adler -Species Science Charade Page 33 officials look at the best there is, however good or bad that may be. If, however, the FWS can only list if the best available data exceeds some predetermined quantitative or qualitative threshold, this necessarily alters the extent to which listing serves an informational function, communicating our best assessment of how at risk a species may or may not be. Such reforms could preclude conservation efforts even where such action would be desirable despite the lack of greater scientific certainty. Inhibiting the communicative function of the listing process could also inhibit even non-regulatory and NGO conservation efforts that rely upon the endangered and threatened lists to help set their conservation priorities. Because science and research the on rarest species may (necessarily) be more limited, threshold requirements for listing adopted in the name of science would have greatest effect on rarest species, some of those most in need of protection Reforms that require additional procedural steps, such as additional peer review or specific types of studies or assessments, will serve to delay listing decisions. Insofar as listing a species (alone, or in combination with program funding 141 ), such measures could undermine the ESA's effectiveness insofar as they delay listing and subsequent conservation efforts.
142
Requiring additional research, peer review, or the accumulation of some minimal quantum of research before a species could be listed might reduce the number of species delisted due to data errors, but at the expense of losing species that go extinct awaiting listing.
143 141 See infra.
142 Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1146 (a statutory peer review requirement would add to the administrative burdens of listing without noticeably increasing the reliability or accuracy of listing decisions."). 143 See Ruhl, Prescribing, supra note __, at 405 ("What a hollow victory for sound science it would be, for example, to spend so much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving the species is endangered that the species is already extinct by the time the decision to protect it is made.").
considered the information and objections in the record, are sufficient. Such standards must be applied faithfully, however. The proverbial "hard look" must, in fact, be a hard look. Agency invocation of science should not be enough to invoke the sort of "super-deference" often applied under Baltimore Gas.
Under traditional administrative law notions of reasoned decision-making, agencies should be required to be candid and transparent about what science does and does not show.
Agencies should be required to acknowledge their premises and presumptions, as well as the policy judgments that inform implementation. Contrary to the suggestion of some reformers, agencies should not be categorically precluded from acting on incomplete or uncertain science. If the best available data suggests a species is endangered, an agency should not be precluded from saying so (though what should be done about such a determination is another matter).
Legislative reforms could be adopted to relieve pressure on endangered species science and reduce the incentive for agencies (and policymakers) to engage in the science charade. In particular, the listing process should be insulated from political and economic pressure. At present the ESA's "protections" are triggered once a species is listed, irrespective of their value for that particular species. 151 As a consequence, the ESA's current regulatory structure both discourages conservation and compromises conservation science.
One possible remedy for this problem, suggested by Professor Wyman is "decoupling" the listing decision from mandatory conservation measures. 152 This would release the pressure to manipulate listing decisions and enable federal agencies "to develop protections tailored to the
